作者：迈克尔·斯宾塞（Michael Spence）2012年4月23日 Project Syndicate
中国和美国目前均处于重大结构性变化中，双方都担心这一变化会结束中国生产低成本产品而美国购买这些产品的幸福时代。特别是，如果这一变化导致两国直接竞争，那么最终只有一方能胜出。
这种担忧不难理解，但它的前提是错误的。中美双方可以从这种新的关系中获益，但首先它们要承认旧的双赢互赖模式已经过时了，现在需要一个全新的模式。
美国和其他西方国家的技术和知识转移让中国劳动密集型出口更具竞争力，同时推动了中国的经济增长。再加上大规模的公共和私人投资，支撑了中国人民的收入上涨。
同时，美国消费者从可贸易制造品的相对价格下降中也获益良多。因此，美国的就业开始向高附加值活动转移，而这反过来也支撑了美国人民收入的增长。
跨国公司越来越高的经营效率和复杂的全球供给链，可随着比较优势指向的变化而转变。全球供给链的大体方向是从东方到西方，反映了全球经济可贸易部门需求的组成和来源。一切都在变化，好处正在从成本转向增长。
随着收入的上升，中国的需求在数量增长的同时，其组成也在日渐偏向成熟的产品和服务。因此，中国的角色也在改变：它曾是西方的低成本供给者，现在正变成西方产品的主要客户。对于发达经济体来说，这是一个重大机会，可以再平衡其增长和就业。
中国人收入的上升也意味着中国将发生结构性变化，因为持续的经济增长需要以向高价值活动转型为前提。技术和知识仍将是重要元素，但中国必须在吸收西方工具和技能的基础上开发新技术。
为应对结构性变化的挑战，美国的政策目标应是扩大可贸易部门的规模，并以就业为中心。将政策中心定位为面向多部门外部需求，而这需关注两大关键性领域：教育和投资。
高质量投资和更高效的技能发展是创造中产阶级就业机会的关键要素，而投资可以纠正美国与全球供给链脱节的问题——特别是中等规模企业。在与全球市场对接方面，更小、更开放的经济体创造了大量贸易公司和基础设施，而美国在这方面的开发还很不足。
诚然，在这些领域取得成功不是一朝一夕就能做到的。但现状也不是不可改变，投资和支持性政策可以改善现状。从短期看，美国可以从相对简单的措施中获益，比如移除外国直接投资的壁垒，特别是来自中国的投资。
至于中国，政策药方则有所不同。在中国，发展不同增长模式的重要性众人皆知，也被写入“十二五”规划。其成功实施要求增强创新激励、深化技术基础、增加人力资本投资、发展金融部门，以及实施对国内外和国有企业一视同仁的竞争政策。
中国仍需获得发达国家的市场和技术，但重点已向国产知识、技能和创新转移；美国仍是创新大国，但也需进入中国市场，在那获得平等的竞争机会，金融部门的发展亦是如此。
在美国，下决心重建财政平衡并建立可持续发展模式，将是经济长期健康的关键。这种再平衡意味着通过扩张出口持续降低经常项目赤字，而非单纯地降低进口。中国的需求将是一大助益，特别是在其经济规模和成熟度与日俱增的情况下。因此，现在扩展与中国的联系可以说是在为未来投资，其回报是不断增加的，且不会很快陷入瓶颈。
美国经常项目赤字收缩也有益于中国，其手中的3.2万亿美元外汇储备正日益变为庞大而危险的投资。美国迈向外部平衡将逐步减少中国的储备，缓和其资产管理心病。
深入认识对方结构性挑战的变迁，有助于中美识别能采取共赢合作的领域。中国需要美国的创新来刺激增长，而美国需要中国的市场来刺激增长。如果双方都想在这种共生关系中获益，只能相互合作、扩大投资、实施改革，没有其他路可以走。
作者迈克尔·斯宾塞为2001年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、纽约大学斯特恩商学院教授
MILAN – China and the United States are in the grip of major structural changes that both dread will end the Halcyon era when China produced low-cost goods and the US bought them. In particular, many fear that if these changes lead to direct competition between the two countries, only one side can win.
That fear is understandable, but the premise is mistaken. Both sides can and should gain from forging a new relationship that reflects evolving structural realities: China’s growth and size relative to the US; rapid technological change, which automates processes and displaces jobs; and the evolution of global supply chains, driven by developing countries’ rising incomes. But first they must acknowledge that the old pattern of mutually beneficial interdependence really has run its course, and that a new model is needed.
The old model served both sides well for three decades. China’s growth was driven by labor-intensive exports made more competitive by transfers of technology and knowledge from the US and other Western countries. This, coupled with massive Chinese public and private investment (enabled by high – and recently excessive – savings), underpinned rising incomes for millions of Chinese.
The US consumer, meanwhile, benefited greatly from declining relative prices of manufactured goods in the tradable side of the economy. Accordingly, US employment shifted to higher-value-added activities, in turn supporting higher incomes in America, too.
Multinational companies operated increasingly efficient and complex global supply chains, which could be reconfigured as the shifting pattern of comparative advantage dictated. Global supply chains ran largely from east to west, reflecting the composition and location of demand in the tradable part of the global economy.
But all of this is starting to change. The benefits are shifting from cost to growth. Supply chains are now running in both directions, and are being combined in novel ways. Chinese demand is not only growing, but, as incomes rise, its composition is shifting to more sophisticated goods and services.
Thus, China’s role is changing: once the West’s low-cost supplier, it is now becoming a major customer for Western products. This represents a major opportunity for advanced economies to rebalance their growth and employment, provided that they are positioned to compete for the appropriate parts of evolving supply chains.
Rising Chinese incomes also imply structural change for China, as continued growth presupposes a shift to higher-value activities. Technology and knowledge will still be important, but China must begin generating new technologies, in addition to absorbing Western tools and skills.
In order to meet the challenges of structural change, the goal for US policy should be to expand the scope of its tradable sector, with a focus on employment. Reorienting US policy toward external demand across a broader array of sectors, in turn, requires attention to two critical areas: education and investment.
High-quality education and more effective skills development are crucial to generating new employment opportunities for the middle class, while investment can rectify America’s disconnection – particularly that of its medium-size businesses – from global supply chains. The trading companies and infrastructure that smaller, more open economies have created in order to connect to global markets are underdeveloped in the US.
To be sure, success in these areas will not come overnight. But nor is the status quo a permanent condition; it can be improved with investment and supportive policy. Moreover, the US would benefit in the short term from relatively simple measures, such as removing barriers to inward foreign direct investment, particularly from China.
On the Chinese side, policy prescriptions are not the issue. The importance of evolving a different growth pattern is already understood, and has been enshrined in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. Its successful implementation will require strengthening incentives to innovate, deepening the technology base, investing more in human capital, developing the financial sector, and applying competition policy equally to domestic, foreign, and state-owned enterprises.
Given the requirements on both sides, how to ensure a productive and mutually beneficial relationship between the US and China is a relatively straightforward matter. China still needs access to advanced-country markets and technology, but the emphasis is shifting to homegrown knowledge, skills, and innovation. The US, still an innovation powerhouse, can help, but requires access to the growing Chinese market and a level playing field once there. The same is true of financial-sector development.
In the US, a determined effort to restore fiscal balance and establish a sustainable growth pattern – that is, one not based on excessive domestic consumption – is crucial to long-term economic health. Such rebalancing implies sustained reduction of the current-account deficit by expanding exports, rather than merely curtailing imports. Chinese demand will help, all the more so as its economy grows in size and sophistication. So expanding linkages with China now is an investment in the future with a rising return, rather than a quick fix.
A lower US current-account deficit will also benefit China, whose $3.2 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves – held mostly in dollar-denominated assets – is becoming a large and risky investment. Progress towards external balance in the US would allow a slow reduction in China’s reserves, alleviating its asset-management headache.
A deeper understanding of each other’s shifting structural challenges would facilitate both sides’ ability to identify areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. But the core of the relationship is simple: China needs US innovation to grow, and the US needs Chinese markets to grow. If both countries are to benefit from such symbiosis, there is no alternative to collaboration, substantial investment, and reforms on both sides of the Pacific.
Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Academic Board Chairman of the Fung Global Institute in Hong Kong, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. His latest book is The Next Convergence – The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World (www.thenextconvergence.com).
.jpg)
